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Abstract  
This paper examines long-term interest rates and fiscal liabilities within EMU in the 
context of the recent sovereign debt crisis; where Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain faced rising interest rates in contrast to the rest of the EMU. An assessment of the 
short and long-run properties of long rates, fiscal deficits and government debt are 
estimated for 11 EMU countries in the time span 1999-2015. This is done through 
different fixed-effects models, 2SLS and Panel-DOLS. No long-run relationship between 
the variables is found. Results also show that fiscal deficits have a positive effect on long 
rates and the interaction between deficits and debt enhance the overall impact on rates, 
in particular to fiscally vulnerable countries. Unexpectedly, government debt show a 
negative effect on interests, a result explained in the context of ECB’s role as lender of 
last resort and the asymmetric effects among EMU members. In conclusion, results 
suggest a subjective punishment for fiscal inadequacy through long-term rates. 
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1 Introduction 
In the late 2009, following the Greece election the newly appointed government 
reassessed the yearly deficit forecast, more than doubling the previous figures. In 
tandem with Greece, fiscal revenues in Ireland and Spain dropped sharply, resulting in 
larger than expected deficits (Lane, 2012). This marked the break-out to the European 
sovereign debt crisis, as it became evident several EMU1 countries had ran consecutive 
deficits and accumulated debt prior to the crisis. Within less than a year both Greece and 
Ireland were bailed-out by the European Central Bank as they were unable to service 
their debt and Portugal followed shortly after (Lane, 2012). In order to assign the guilty, 
attention has ranged from blaming inept fiscal governing in the GIIPS 2  countries, 
irrational market reactions driving up yields, credit agencies faulty ratings and all the 
way to proposing this to be a healthy market reaction punishing those behaving badly 
(De Grauwe, 2010; Featherstone, 2011; Aizenman et al, 2013; De Grauwe, 2013). On the 
other hand, both Belgium and Italy joined EMU without fulfilling the minimum debt 
level, tailed by France and Greece which piled up debt since the early 2000s. In addition, 
building up to the crisis government bond rates had been kept low although debts had 
risen steadily for a majority of EMU countries, thus fuelled excessive borrowing due to 
the low cost of debt (Lane, 2012). As it will become clear, underestimating the effect of 
markets inability to incorporate fiscal fundamentals had dire consequences. 
 Going back to when EMU was implemented, one of the motives was to 
provide financial stability through common monetary policy and elimination of exchange 
risk (EMI, 1995). In contradiction, historically the way out of excessive public debt has 
often been assigned to currency devaluation. Moreover, fiscal policy continued to be a 
national matter with two conditions: First, the Stability and Growth Pact which imposed 
restrictions upon fiscal deficit and government debt 3. Second, nations could not be 
bailed-out in the case of default. These conditions have been challenged to be both vague 
and even insufficient to prevent countries to not run deficits (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 
2009; Gali, 2010; Beck and Prinz, 2012). The first requirement was violated by Italy, 
Belgium and Greece in the moment they joined the EMU; the former two due to holding 
debt levels above the required 60 percent and the Greece because of fiscal deficits 
                                                 
1 EMU will be discussed in the context of phase three, launched on 1 January 1999 introducing 
the euro (ECB, 2016a). 
2 This was a term coined to incorporate the most troubled countries during the crisis, namely: 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (Dergiades et al, 2014) 
3 Stability and Growth Pact, further information see: ECB (2016b) 
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breaching 3 percent. In addition, Portugal and Spain had a history of high debts just 
recently lowering their levels below said requirement. In the years following the 
beginning of EMU, debt levels rose steadily within the union and the maximum deficit of 
three percent were violated by a number of countries This fiscal laxity argued to be a 
consequence of ECB being unable to impose demands upon recurrent violators; partly 
due to France and Germany both dodging repercussions to their on violations (Lane, 
2009; Buti et al, 2003). Also, during these boom years running up to 2007, the market 
seemed to be indifferent regarding fiscal liabilities. Hence, the long-term interest rates 
which converged in the starting days of the EMU, kept the same for all EMU countries 
until 2008, regardless of fiscal stance. 
The homogeneity in-between countries regarding low interest rates enabled 
the excessive borrowing due the low cost, even though debts levels indicated 
considerably higher risk. In hindsight, long rates mispriced the risk of government debt 
to the extent that Greece and Portugal were unable to finance their large yearly deficits 
whilst Ireland and Spain boomed their housing market (Lane, 2009). In the latter case, 
both countries became reliant on tax revenues from the construction sector, consequently 
the years of fiscal order resulted in a recoil. When the crisis hit, long rates raised 
exponentially for countries deemed prone to default, raising the price of debt.   
Furthermore, countries who carried unsustainable debt could not seek funding from IMF 
without help from the private sector (Lane, 2009). A natural response by the markets 
would be an all over risk-adjustment through rising interest rates. But, due to the 
overarching scare that rising interest rates would pull the whole EMU into a recession, 
the ECB initiated open market operations to buy up government debt in order to push 
rates down. This action was directed asymmetrically among member countries, 
conditional to if said bonds held a good enough rating. This arbitrary help has opened to 
discussion whether some countries are indirectly getting punished through high interest 
rates (Lane, 2009; De Grauwe, 2010; Kopf, 2010). More precise, as spreads rose it 
became harder for the GIIPS countries to seek funding compared to the rest of EMU. 
Arguably, the blame was assigned to countries holding large amount of fiscal liabilities, 
punished through high interest rates. All the same, the ambivalent reaction from long 
rates within the EMU and the apparent persistence to turn the crisis around, economists 
has sought-after answers to which effect fiscal fundamentals actually has on long-term 
interest rates and how these affected the recent crisis. 
 In this paper, I will analyse the effect government debt and fiscal deficit has 
on long-term interest for 11 EMU countries during the years 1999-2015. More distinctly, 
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the emphasis lies on both the short and long-run effects and how debt interacts with 
deficits. Additionally, I will examine potential disparities in the outcome following the 
EU debt crisis and in particular the GIIPS countries. This will be done using both 
cointegration analysis (long-run) and panel regressions (short-run) to provide cohesive 
results. The purpose of this paper can be summarized to: 
 
Is there a disparity to how fiscal liabilities affect long-term interest rates within EMU? 
 
Theory generally suggests a positive relationship between fiscal deficits and long-term 
rates in the short-run, excluding an increase due to expansionary policy. Similarly debt 
also has positive relationship to long rates through crowding-out effects or rise in risk-
premia. However, empirical provides evidence which is mixed to whether the effects are 
positive or negative. This might have to do with country-specific effects, credibility, the 
historical fiscal record or unique characteristics of policy-makers – all of which are hard 
to incorporate in general equilibrium models. In order to evaluate the short-term effects 
a series of panel regressions with appropriate dummies and specifications are used to 
evaluate specific effects and provide robustness. This includes a number of Fixed-Effects 
models using robust errors, Generalized Least Squares (GLS), and Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS). The long-run effects will be examined through cointegration testing and 
further applying Panel-DOLS. Through all regressions, focus will be put on the effect on 
long-term interest rates that government debt, fiscal deficits and an interactive variable 
between the two might have. 
 This paper adds to current research in a number of ways. First, by applying 
analysis to a recent sample of EMU countries in contrast to previous studies applied to 
single countries, the OECD or the EMU convergence before the debt crisis – thus missing 
out on the specific effects from the aftermath of the crisis. Secondly, it proposes the 
hypothesis of both a short and long-term disparity to effects of holding fiscal risk within 
the EMU. It also applies previous research and expands it, most notably by including a 
variable of interaction in between government debt and fiscal deficits. Lastly, as most 
research has focused solely on the short-term effect, I will provide a long-term 
assessment through Panel-DOLS. 
 Results indicate no long-term effect between government debt and long 
rates. In the short-run, the interactive effect between fiscal deficits and government debt 
is positive, affecting the GIIPS countries to a larger extent. This supports the hypothesis 
of a disparity in the short-run and a further discussion examining the causes of the EMU 
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debt crisis is presented. Some limitations to both the short and long-term estimation 
should be acknowledged. First, due to data being quarterly, unavailability of expected 
variables which has been proven effective in earlier studies has been excluded, most 
notably projected fiscal standings. Also, the paper’s purpose sets limitation in time and 
imposes a problem to distinguish cointegrating relationships. Lastly, as long-term 
interest rates are affected by numerous other channels than debt and fiscal deficit, 
modelling such a variable is by default challenging. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, in the next 
section I present previous research. In section 2 I describe the channels of impact to long 
interests. In Section 3 the methodology and data is presented. In Section 4 model 
specification and estimation will be discussed. In section 5 results are presented and 
lastly in section 6 some concluding remarks are made.  
1.1 Previous Research 
In earlier studies, several efforts have been done in order to examine the effects between 
fiscal liabilities and long interest rates. In most studies, either long-interest rates or 
corresponding spread are modelled against both government debt and fiscal deficit 
various types of panel-regression specifications. There has also been substantial amount 
of literature written on the theoretical foundations of public debt, fiscal deficits and long 
interests. In this section, the combination of the empirical and theoretical endeavours 
done by foregoing researchers will be outlined. 
 Typically, estimating the effects of fiscal fundamentals on long rates are 
either a panel regression or cross-sectional matter for the short-run and some sort of 
cointegration analysis is the norm regarding the long-run properties. This method has 
been predominately successful in terms of providing robust estimates, although varying 
in magnitude across studies. In Laubach (2009) it was found that expected values of 
fiscal deficits had larger impact than current deficits. Results indicate long rates are 
raised by 20-29 basis points by a one percent change in expected deficit and by 3-4 basis 
points by a similar change in expected debt. Comparable results for projected debt and 
deficit is found by Engen and Hubbard (2004). Advantages of incorporating projected 
variables can be assigned by capturing expectations of the current fiscal stance and 
match the forward-looking markets. Thus, models that are predictive propose that 
countries can hold a large debt and keep low interest if their projected fiscal situation is 
sustainable. Results from projected regression has been tested against a theoretical 
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simulation in a general equilibrium framework, supporting both the empirical results 
and the underlying theory (Engen and Hubbard, 2004; Kinoshita, 2006). 
 A drawback to projected variables is the restrictions in terms of availability 
and frequency. Nevertheless, work has been done without the use of expected fiscal 
variables, instead relying on present values. Once again, the results in Laubach (2009) 
propose that nominal values have a smaller effect than projected. Using current values, 
Ardagna et al (2007) examines 16 OECD countries, finding a 10 basis points effect due to 
a one percent change in deficits. In the same paper, several hypotheses are tested 
regarding non-linear effects from debt, the effect from an overarching institution or 
country and also dealing with the endogeneity issues using IV estimation for variables 
likely to suffer from reverse causality. Results indicate that all said estimates are 
significant parameters in determining long interest rates, suggesting asymmetry in the 
effects both from the parameters and the relationship to the overarching policy-maker.  
           Similar results regarding asymmetry or more precise debts levels is found 
by Faini (2006); results show that unsustainably high debts levels can differ between 
countries and will affect interest rates exponentially if breached. In the same paper, he 
also proposes critique to theory simulated results (Engen and Hubbard, 2004) due to the 
empirically weak assumption of a Cobb-Douglas economy, thus underestimating the 
effects of fiscal deficits. Returning to high debt-levels being an important factor; in Drudi 
and Prati (1999) where Italy, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark is analysed for the years 
1970-1990 this is examined. Their findings indicate it is crucial to when fiscal deficits 
happen as well as the condition of debt when both factors are at a “fragile” state. Even 
though estimated separately, their results indicate it is the sustainability between debt 
and deficit that determine the effect on long interests. Last, Baldacci and Kumar (2010) 
use a panel estimation of both advanced and emerging economies. Their main finding 
adding to previous research is that the initial fiscal position will determine to which 
extent the impact high debt has on interest rates. 
 The long-term relationship between long rates and fiscal fundamentals is 
sparsely researched empirically. Studies can be divided between theoretical based 
(Kinoshita, 2006; Laubach, 2003; Engen and Hubbard, 2004) and empirically oriented 
(Poghosyan, 2010; Ardagna, 2007). Theoretical studies rely on the assumptions and to 
which extent the parameter values can be estimated. Their results indicate that there is 
a small positive effect of debt upon interest rates. In the empirical attempts to evaluate 
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the long-run effect, Poghosyan (2010) employs a middle-ground PMG4 estimation which 
accounts for both the cointegrating long-term effects as well as the short-term effects. A 
positive relationship between long-rates and government debt is found, indicating that 
yields will increase by 2 basis points following a one percent change in government debt. 
However, the results are based on lose assumptions of non-stationary; most notably 
panel-unit root tests propose widely different results regarding stationarity.  
 Lastly, econometric techniques used in this paper can be assigned to 
Pedroni (1999) for developing panel cointegration and the work by Saikkonen (1992) and 
Stock and Watson (1993) for defining the Panel-DOLS estimator. The latter has not been 
used in similar studies evaluating long rates and government debt whilst Pedroni’s tests 
are used in Poghosyan (2010).    
2 Long-term Interest Rates: Channels of Impact 
In order to examine the effects fiscal deficits and government debt has on long-term 
interest it is suitable to evaluate the wide array of theory on the topic paired with 
representative empirical data. The assumptions prevailing for different theories will 
alter based on which channels that interest rates are affected through and how the 
dynamics work in the short respectively long run. Evaluating both at the same time is 
reasonable since debt is the accumulated past deficits. Following sections will be divided 
into three parts; (i) discuss the importance in the role of government debt and fiscal 
policy have on interest rates, (ii) examine the conflicting evidence regarding the role of 
fiscal liabilities, (iii) provide an explanation to the term-structure for long interests rate 
and the influence from ECB to said structure.    
2.1 The Importance of Fiscal Fundamentals 
Both government debt and fiscal deficits have central parts in macroeconomic models. 
However, predicting the effects it might have on interest rates is quite the task.  It is 
suitable to start with a standard production function where debt is exogenous and an 
increase in government debt will crowd-out capital. This is due to private investors 
facing higher interest rates when government debt rise, will put less resources in capital, 
implicitly decreasing the capital-stock and leading to a higher marginal product of 
capital and increasing interest rates (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). Important to note at 
this stage is that debt is merely accumulated debt, hence a change in debt is by 
                                                 
4 Pooled Mean Group. 
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definition corresponding deficit.  Thus, deficit is often analysed as the short-run and 
government debt for the long-run (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1998). Furthermore, the 
economy is presumed to be classical in the long-run (crowding-out) but Keynesian in the 
short-run. The short-run effects are typically seen through the standard IS-LM 
framework where an increase in fiscal deficits is a result of government spending, thus 
increasing the aggregate demand. Hence, an increase in fiscal deficit (spending) shifts 
the aggregate demand curve upwards to a point of higher interest rates. However, the 
idea is that government spending stimulates the economy and increase output, 
counteracting the increase in the debt ratio. Therefore, there can be a discrepancy if 
interest rates increase as a consequence to expansionary fiscal policy in contrast to 
increasing deficits due to laxity (Bernheim, 1987).  
 Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) discuss four additional ways in which 
government debt might interact with fiscal deficits and interest rates. First, government 
debt is priced through long-term interest rates, or, the ability to service held debt. 
Therefore, high debts levels might raise doubt regarding debtholders ability to service 
their obligations; consequently rates adjust to compensate for the high risk. Action to 
unexpected rise in interest can be taken by central banks through expansionary 
monetary policy, lowering interest rates in the short-run and while returning to their 
original state in the long-run. Consequently, such actions tend to raise inflation and 
lower interest rates. In context of EMU and current sovereign debt crisis, ECB took a 
position as lender of last resort to ensure low interests5. Secondly, government debt can 
limit further financing, especially if debts are high and there is a need to borrow, in 
particular during crisis. Looking back at history, governments stuck in such a position 
has tried to finance its way out of such matter with the help of central banks using 
seigniorage. This is however a case of the past due to numerous cases of hyperinflation 
and consequently the benefit of independent central banks are currently the norm. As for 
EMU and recent crisis, countries stuck in this position have been unable to conduct 
monetary policy and unable to fund sovereign debt due to high interests (Lane, 2009). 
Thirdly, availability to borrow money will affect in the way fiscal policy is conducted. 
This might hurt budget discipline or provide incentives for short-sighted policies. 
Economists as early as Wicksell (1896) tackled this issue, as he said if financing were 
supported by a majority of voters, financing would probably be a possibility. The problem 
is much like the Ricardian, namely the lack of future tax payers vote in current deficit 
                                                 
5 In 2012, ECB took the role as “lender of last resort” in order to ensure liquidity within EMU (De 
Grauwe, 2013) 
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accumulation, or likewise, future debt level. Again in context to recent developments in 
the EMU, prior governments in several countries have been building up debt, enabled by 
low rates possible through the euro and the combination of ignorance and expedience 
(Lane, 2009). Lastly a fourth aspect is proposed, with a more globally integrated 
economy, international flexibility and confidence might be hurt by deficits or a high 
enough debt (Feldstein, 1986). The effects due to fallen reputation reflect lower 
credibility by the international markets, lowering the demand for domestic bonds and 
increasing the long rates. This was one of the problems which pushed several of indebted 
countries within the EMU to default, as they were unable to turnaround capital from the 
market (Lane, 2009).   
2.2 Taking the Opposing View 
Previous section provides a summary to what is expected by fiscal deficit and public 
debt; however the conventional view has been challenged throughout the years. 
Foremost by a benchmark theorem in economics, namely the Ricardian Equivalence, 
implying that there is no difference between financing public spending by debt or taxes6. 
If the theorem holds, it simply states that government spending and the accumulated 
version in terms of debt will have no effect on the economy in the long run. Elmendorf 
and Mankiw (1998) discuss the importance of this theorem in the context of fiscal 
spending. If a change in fiscal expenditure does not affect the economy in the long-run 
this also holds for interest rates. At a first glance the theory is more relatable to 
permanent-income theory; nonetheless it holds implications to issuing of government 
debt and the discussion of forward-looking policy.  
In Barro (1974) the equivalence idea was applied to government bonds, 
proposing a tax-cut funded by selling of bonds were just a term of redistribution, leaving 
net wealth unchanged. What is telling regarding the Ricardian world is the wide array of 
critique which opened a debate to whether debt will affect the economy or not. The 
critique can be assigned the assumptions regarding intergenerational distribution. Thus, 
debt taken on today is a way to move today’s tax-burden into the future. This leads to a 
higher income of today and will alter the interest rates. A counter-argument was 
proposed by Barro (1974) as he said today’s generations will care about their future 
families and be unwilling to put a high tax-burden in their hands. Further critique can 
                                                 
6First proposed by David Ricardo in 1820, elegantly illustrating that financing can be done 
through either taxes or debt for the same present value (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen 2010: 440-
443). 
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be summarized to the myopic behaviour of consumers. There are a number of different 
utility profiles, some might use a lower tax today due to being credit constrained, others 
will act short-sighted and be unaware of future tax-hikes if political climate change or 
fail to recognize higher tax burden of tomorrow (Mankiw and Elmendorf, 1998). Taking a 
look at the EMU, one would think the Ricardian view was held as consensus. Fiscal 
irresponsibility has been raised as one of the main perpetrators to the sovereign debt 
crisis. Both Greece and Portugal increased their government consumption and held 
yearly deficits running up to the crisis. Barro’s bond proposition is also contradicted, as 
issuing of government debt can result in further complications than repayment, in the 
case of EMU this would be default.  Yet, support for the Ricardian case is found in 
Plosser (1982) and (1987), thus indicate that the zero effect cannot be rejected entirely.      
2.3 Term-structure and the Role of ECB 
Determining the long-term interest rates in the economy is represented by the average of 
expected and current interest rates assuming risk-neutrality.7 If there are risk-averse 
investors a suitable risk-premia need to be added. Plotting a yield curve will thus differ 
with expectations from market participants; keep flat for expected constant interest 
rates, slope upwards if growth is expected to increase and downwards if the economy is 
expected to slow down. Hence, short-term interest rate according to the expectations 
hypothesis determines long-term interest. In order to understand how this might affect 
long-term interest one should consider that most Central Banks apply versions of the 
Taylor rule to set their interest rates (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen 2010). Without going 
further into said rule, being outside the scope of this paper, this rule simply tells us that 
interest rates are affected by monetary policy and further deviations from natural output 
and inflation. 
 Within the EMU, the ECB conducts monetary policy for all the member 
countries. Just as most central banks, their pronounced focus lies on keeping financial 
stability through an inflation target. When the sovereign debt crisis hit the economy was 
already in financial crisis. Thus, to prevent EU from going into a recession the ECB held 
the interests low through open market operations, purchasing government bonds (De 
Grauwe, 2013). Quantitative easing in this matter is used in several highly indebted 
countries in the likes of US, Japan, UK and now within EMU (Lane, 2009). In this 
                                                 
7 Assuming risk-neutrality, itlong=
1
n (it+it-1
e …it+n-1
e ), this can applied for any underlying asset. For 
full discussion and derivation see Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010: 463-464). 
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quartet, EMU is a clear outsider being a monetary union, providing the alternative of 
different effects to different countries. If the effect from such an operation can ensure 
sustainability, the can push rates down even though holding high debt. Another aspect 
the possibility of different effects is a new trilemma proposed by Beck and Prinz (2012), 
which states there is an impossibility to have fiscal sovereignty, independent monetary 
policy and a no bailout clause within a currency union. These three are all a part of the 
EMU standard and would thus lead to failure in one of the aspects. When the debt crisis 
unravelled, the no-bail out clause was breached for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Given this specific assumption, incentives points towards an unsustainable union and 
would also imply there needs to be one or several scapegoats. In this case, both IMF and 
ECB had standards to bonds holding a certain rating in order to ensure liquidity (Lane, 
2009). Countries without this possibility faced higher interest rates not reaping the 
benefits other countries had from these open market operations. 
3 Data 
The analysis is performed for 11 EMU countries covering years 1999-2015 using 
quarterly data. Included countries are the following: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), 
Germany (DEU), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), 
Netherlands (NDL), Portugal (PRT) and Spain (ESP). Countries denoted by i=1, 2,…N 
and time follows t=1, 2,…T where N marks the 11 countries and T marks the 68 quarters 
included. All countries except Greece were a part of the originating EMU members and 
Luxemburg is excluded due to data limitations. However, due to Greece being a major 
part in the EU sovereign debt crisis, also joining EMU reasonably early in 2001 and 
focus will lie on the effect after the crisis broke out, Greece is included in the analysis. 
The time period stretches from the start of the EMU in January 1999 until the fourth 
quarter of 2015. This is a relatively short time-period which might affect the results of 
our analysis, foremost the cointegration analysis.  
Three variables and their interactions are in focus in the analysis: Long-
term interest rates (LTIit) , Government debt (GDEBTit)  and Government deficit 
(GDEFit). All values are nominal and both GDEBT and GDEF are as a ratio of nominal 
GDP. Also, an interactive variable between GDEBT and GDEF is constructed by INTit8. 
In addition, using common practice a series control variables are added based on theory 
and earlier research, these are: Inflation (INFit), Short-term interest rate (STIit) and 
                                                 
8 Simply the product of GDEFit×GDEBTit=INTit. 
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GDP growth (GDPGit). There are no missing values and thus the panel is strongly 
balanced. All variables used are collected using DataStream and extracted from Oxford 
Economics’ databank. In following sections there will be a brief presentation of 
descriptive statistics followed by an empirical presentation of the data. 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Here, a brief presentation of the descriptive statistics is done. In Table 3.1 variable 
characteristics are presented. As seen, none of the variables has missing observations 
and all variables have a total of 748 observations. The whole panel has an average debt 
level of about 62 percent and an average quarterly deficit of 2.85 percent. Deviation 
between lowest debt ratio of 12.9 percent and the highest of 132 percent suggests some 
heterogeneity in fiscal liabilities between countries. Also, the largest deficit reached 29.1 
percent compared to the largest surplus of 10 percent. Long-term interests have a mean 
of roughly 4.3 percent and differ from the lowest value of 0.31 percent to highest of 25.4 
percent. Integration order informs whether the certain variable is stationary or not. 
Those variables integrated of order one will be estimated in differences, explained more 
carefully in the next section. 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Number 
of obs. 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max Integration 
order 
Long-term interest rate 748 0.04295 0.0233 0.0031 0.2540 I(1) 
Debt-to-GDP ratio 748 0.6198 0.2626 0.1289 1.3172 I(1) 
Deficit-to-GDP ratio 748 -0.0285 0.0436 -0.2931 0.1034 I(0) 
Interactive variable 748 -0.0294 0.0309 -0.3266 0.0335 I(0) 
Inflation 748 0.0194 0.0145 -0.0609 0.0663 I(1) 
Short-term interest 
rate 
748 0.0229 0.0173 -0.0001 0.1080 I(0) 
GDP growth 748 0.0036 0.0108 -0.0685 0.0619 I(0) 
Note: All variables are from Oxfords Economics, using quarterly data. All variables are expressed 
in percent. Unit root tests can be found in the Appendix under Table 4.2. 
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3.2 Data Overview 
In this section data will examined closer in order to understand estimation procedure 
and provide an intuitive explanation to the developments within the EMU. Government 
debt will be presented in different timestamps chosen to represent certain events. Only 
one such break will be done within the regression analysis later, marking the start of the 
debt crisis. The four timestamps are: The first quarter of 1999 that marks the start of 
EMU, the first quarter of 2005 marks the high point during the boom with no effects of 
the crisis yet seen, the fourth quarter of 2009 marks the outbreak followed by Greece 
election in October the same year and last the fourth quarter of 2015 which is simply 
marks the end of the available data series. This is a practical simplification of the events 
for this time period nonetheless it does provide adequate information in this instance. 
 The long-term interest is the dependent variable in further analysis. During 
starting years of EMU interests fully converged. Only Greece deviated before their 
accession in 2001 and then converged leading up to the crisis. A clear break is seen in 
2009 but signs started to erupt in early 2008. In Figure 3.1, long rates from 2008 to the 
end period are displayed. Throughout the crisis years it can be seen that the GIIPS 
countries have the highest interest rates. Greece went from below 5 percent to a peak 
above 25 percent in 2012, Portugal rose to around 15 percent also in 2012, Ireland 
peaked during the second quarter of 2011 with above 10 percent, both Spain and Italy 
went slightly above 5 percent but did not take off like the three previously mentioned. 
However, both Spain and Italy deviated with around 5 percent from the remaining 
countries not being a part of the GIIPS group. These countries also saw an overall 
decrease of interest rates from slightly below 5 percent to a steady decreasing rate, 
reaching below 1 percent during 2014. In the end period, the GIIPS countries, with the 
exception of Greece, have also shown signs of convergence to lower interests. 
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Figure 3.1 Long-term interest rates, all countries 
 
Source: Oxford Economics 
 
Furthermore, taking a look at fiscal standings, they will be analysed at said timestamps 
expressed in present values. In Table 3.2, debt-to-GDP ratio is presented for all 
countries. Bold numbers marks at which timestamp they first breached the acceptable 
60 percent level decided by the Stability and Growth pact. Only Germany can be 
excluded for breaching this limit during the evaluated years. Both Belgium and Italy had 
this debt level upon entering the EMU and were followed at next timestamp in 2005 by 
both France and Greece. In contrast to interest rates, debt ratios are high for the 
majority of countries. Both Ireland and Spain had seemingly low debt ratios when the 
crisis started, although with a steep slope upwards between the last two timestamps, 
which changed 45 to 85 percent for Spain and 32 to 72 percent for Ireland. Portugal 
reached 60 percent at the start of the crisis and was representing the median level of 
debt when the crisis broke out. Noteworthy are the progression of Austria, Belgium and 
France which are well above Ireland and Spain at all timestamps and more or less 
exceeds Portugal for all periods. Belgium is in the end of the sample at 118 percent of 
GDP and France at 115 percent at GDP, not far away from Greece’s 122 percent.  
 
Table 3.2 Debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Source: Oxford Economics 
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Timestamp AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT
1999-Q1 0,47 0,92 0,41 0,36 0,38 0,56 0,43 0,24 0,78 0,47 0,29
2005-Q1 0,56 0,83 0,48 0,32 0,32 0,66 0,63 0,16 0,82 0,44 0,43
2009-Q4 0,76 0,90 0,53 0,45 0,37 0,82 0,88 0,32 0,99 0,53 0,60
2015-Q4 0,91 1,18 0,52 0,85 0,64 1,15 1,22 0,72 1,32 0,71 0,97
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The quarterly fiscal deficits are presented in Table 3.3, also displayed as percent of GDP. 
In this case, it would be illogical to choose a certain time and these will instead be 
presented as yearly averages. Numbers marked with bold text marks yearly deficits 
which breached the 3 percent advised by the Stability and Growth pact in at least three 
consecutive years and the dotted line marks the years after the crisis started. In this 
case, Greece and Portugal are running large deficits on a yearly basis since the start and 
Greece fail to have a single period under the 3 percent mark. Italy is slightly above or at 
the mark for the majority of years. Both Ireland and Spain saw a break in 2008 having 7 
respectively 6 percent in deficits that year. In their case, it had to do with both of them 
being largely affected by the mortgage crisis, having an excessive construction sector9. In 
addition, France has had above the acceptable level since 2008 and both Netherlands 
and Belgium has had consecutive deficits after the crisis. 
 
Table 3.3 Deficit-to-GDP ratio, Yearly Averages 
 
Source: Oxfords Economics 
 
The data would suggest a somewhat arbitrary picture to why certain countries have 
suffered from high interest rates. In common for the GIIPS countries have been the 
combination of high debt levels and years of consecutive deficits. Both Spain and Italy 
has had lower interests than Ireland, Greece and Portugal. This is although Spain and 
Ireland have seemingly similar fiscal profiles and Italy holding high debt levels since the 
start. In addition, France which has had both high debt and high deficits show no 
positive effect on interest rates. Just by looking at the data, this might imply some sort 
                                                 
9 See Lane (2009) 
Year AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT
1999 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,02 -0,02 -0,06 0,05 -0,02 0,01 -0,03
2000 -0,02 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,07 -0,01 -0,04 0,07 -0,01 0,02 -0,03
2001 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,00 0,05 -0,02 -0,05 0,02 -0,03 0,00 -0,04
2002 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 -0,01 0,03 -0,03 -0,07 0,01 -0,03 -0,01 -0,04
2003 -0,02 -0,02 -0,04 0,00 0,02 -0,04 -0,09 0,02 -0,03 -0,02 -0,05
2004 -0,05 -0,03 -0,03 0,00 0,02 -0,03 -0,08 0,03 -0,04 -0,01 -0,06
2005 -0,02 0,00 -0,02 0,02 0,03 -0,03 -0,06 0,03 -0,04 0,00 -0,06
2006 -0,02 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,04 -0,02 -0,06 0,03 -0,03 0,01 -0,04
2007 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,05 -0,03 -0,07 0,00 -0,02 0,01 -0,02
2008 -0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,06 0,03 -0,04 -0,12 -0,07 -0,03 0,00 -0,05
2009 -0,05 -0,05 -0,05 -0,11 -0,03 -0,07 -0,15 -0,15 -0,05 -0,05 -0,10
2010 -0,04 -0,04 -0,03 -0,09 -0,02 -0,06 -0,09 -0,24 -0,04 -0,04 -0,11
2011 -0,02 -0,04 0,00 -0,09 -0,01 -0,05 -0,10 -0,07 -0,03 -0,04 -0,07
2012 -0,02 -0,05 0,00 -0,10 -0,03 -0,05 -0,10 -0,04 -0,03 -0,03 -0,06
2013 -0,02 -0,03 0,00 -0,07 -0,03 -0,04 -0,11 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,04
2014 -0,03 -0,03 0,00 -0,06 -0,03 -0,04 -0,04 0,00 -0,03 -0,02 -0,07
2015 -0,02 -0,02 0,01 -0,05 -0,03 -0,04 -0,07 0,01 -0,03 -0,02 -0,04
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of “large” country bias which would indicate they are less likely to fail or have some sort 
of characteristic which make them less prone to the risk-adjustment.   
4 Model Specification and Estimation 
In this section, different model specifications, stationary tests, cointegration properties 
and endogeneity issues are considered. First, the baseline model is presented as follows: 
 
LTIit=αi+β1GDEBTit+β2GDEFit+INTit+Г'Ct+uit  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable LTIit  is the long-term interest rate, αi  is the country-
specific fixed effects, GDEBTit  is government debt-to-GDP ratio, GDEFit  is the fiscal 
deficit-to-GDP ratio and INTit is the interactive term between the two. The vector Г' 
captures estimates from variables within vector Ct . This vector is specified as: 
{Ct=STIit, INFit, GDPGit} and involves control variables where STIit is the 3-month short-
term interest rate, INFit  is the nominal inflation and GDPGit  is the GDP growth 
expressed in percent. Lastly, uit is an error-term assumed to be uncorrelated with all 
said variables10. This model is estimated with a fixed effects model including individual-
specific intercept to account for omitted time-invariant characteristics in-between 
individuals11. 
 While the fixed effects model provides a sound start, there are some issues 
to be tackled. First, the countries in the estimation are likely to show signs of 
heteroscedasticity. Specifically the error-term, uit, is likely to differ between countries 
holding different amount of debt and deficit.  Second, variables in the sample might be 
determined by past values and thus show signs of autocorrelation. For example, 
government debt is the accumulated value of past deficits and next periods value will 
thus depend on past values. These issues will be evaluated in different ways; first by 
including robust standard errors in the fixed effect model in order to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. In order to deal with both problems at the same time, Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) technique is applied as a robustness check. Of course, due to 
                                                 
10 This is assumed for the non-lagged models (Verbeek, 2012: 377:378) 
11 See (Verbeek, 2012: 374-376). 
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variance-covariance structure of errors being unknown, the estimation will follow the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation12.  
 A third issue with the baseline regression are the suspicion of endogeneity. 
This is accounted for in earlier studies (Ardagna et al, 2007; Faini, 2006) and in a similar 
fashion, a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)13 is estimated using the lagged explanatory 
variables as instruments.  
4.1 Unit Root and Stationarity Properties 
Panel unit-root tests are performed for all panels of variables. Several such tests are 
available and tests are chosen such that lag length for augmented Dickey-Fuller 
regressions can be specified other than one. Since data are quarterly and similar studies 
has detected several variables to be integrated of first order (Laubach, 2009; Faini, 2006; 
Ardagna et al, 2007), it is intuitive to assume quarterly data might show persistence for 
up to four periods. First, Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test for unit root is performed and to 
provide further robustness Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test is included. These tests are 
presented in Table 4.1 (see Appendix) for each of the variables. 
All tests indicate that government debt and long-term interest are non-
stationary at a 1 percent significance level. Additionally, in IPS test the short-term 
interest rate is non-stationary and in LLC test inflation is non-stationary. Since other 
unit-roots test available for panels only account for first difference stationarity, these are 
the most decisive estimates available. In the preceding estimations, short-term interest 
rates will be treated as non-stationary and inflation as stationary, following IPS 
estimation. This is based on the theory behind term-structure proposed in section 2.3, 
namely that long-interest rates are determined by the accumulated short-term interest 
rates, proposing them as a good control variable for cointegration tests and further 
Panel-DOLS. However, the estimates and conclusions drawn from cointegration are to be 
taken with prudence. 
                                                 
12 FGLS estimates the unknown variances from sample data and residuals, applying a weight to 
the regression variables. FGLS for panels is a random effects estimator which possesses the 
benefits from both the fixed effects and within estimation, provides more efficient and unbiased 
estimates than OLS (Verbeek, 2012: 382-384) 
13 See Baltagi (2008: 120-124)  
 
 
18 
 
4.2 Panel Cointegration 
According to Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test, long-term interest rate, government debt 
and short-term interest are significantly non-stationary. Thus examining their 
cointegrating relationship is possible. More precise, it is the cointegrating relationship 
between the dependent variable LTI and two the explanatory variables GDEBT and STI. 
Seminal work in the area of panel cointegration was introduced and developed by 
Pedroni (1997; 1999) and most recently in Westerlund (2007). In Westerlund (2007) it is 
shown his method for panel cointegration provides a more efficient estimation of the 
cointegrating vector when dealing with heterogeneity among panels. Hence, 
Westerlund’s test for panel cointegration is used. The test performs four different 
cointegration tests in order to determine the possibility of cointegration both at an 
individual and panel level. The number of leads and lags are chosen to 2 to 3, this due to 
the AIC criteria for lag length ending up between 2 and 3 regardless of higher lag 
selection. These results are presented in Table 4.2 (see Appendix). 
 First, for the individual level STI has a significant error-correction term of 
-2.311 one individual test and -3.772 at one panel test. GDEBT has error-correction 
terms of -4.624 and -3.937 which are both significant for panel level. Test-statistics for 
the two combined are significant -1.928 at  one individual test and -7.729 and -9176 for 
both panel levels. Error-correction terms show that the speed of adjustment and are 
negative, in accord with results in Westerlund (2007). Since cointegration was found at a 
panel-level for STI and GDEBT as well as the two combined, results motivate further 
analysis of the long-run relationship. 
4.3 Panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) 
A modest amount of studies has tried to apply error-correction panel modelling in order 
to determine the long-term relationship between government debt and long rates.14 The 
benefit of using Panel-DOLS is the introduction of higher order integration than one, 
thus suiting particularly well for quarterly data. Developed by Saikkonen (1992), Stock 
and Watson (1993) and Kao and Chiang (2000), Panel-DOLS estimates the long-run 
error-correction for a system of cointegrated variables assuming long-run homogeneous 
covariance structure between cross-sectional units. In Kao and Chiang (2000) it is also 
shown Panel-DOLS exhibit less bias than similar estimators. Numbers of leads and lags 
                                                 
14 In Poghosyan (2010) a PMG estimation technique is used. 
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are chosen to two and four, reasoning with macroeconomic intuition estimators following 
a half to one year persistence. Results are presented in the next section.  
4.4 Additional Specifications 
Proposed by earlier studies and in the data section, there are both empirical as well as 
intuitive reasons to apply certain variables for this case. Most notably are the previous 
research (Ardagna et al, 2007; Faini, 2006) that propose a certain level of debt will have 
is necessary and the possibility of non-linear effects from fiscal variables. Four new 
variables are created for this purpose; first two variables that are the quadratic value of 
GDEBT and GDEF. Secondly, GDEBT and GDEF are subtracted by their median value 
and then raised by 2, to point out if the exponential effect is larger for fiscally 
constrained countries. These variables are specified as GDEBT2  and GDEF2  for 
regularly squared as well as GDEBT*2 and GDEF*2 when subtracted by median then 
squared. 
 Secondly, the long-term interest rates converged when the EMU was 
implemented and maintained at a steady rate for the years following. Hence, the time 
period will be evaluated after 2009, marking the outbreak of the debt crisis within EU. 
Additionally, the five countries Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain experienced 
the sharpest rise in interest, thus specific regressions that compare the GIIPS countries 
with non-GIIPS are performed. This is done by dummies dividing the estimation into the 
following six specifications: The full sample for the whole period, GIIPS countries for the 
whole period, non-GIIPS countries for the whole period, the GIIPS after 2009, the non-
GIIPS after 2009 and the full sample after 2009. Groups are chosen based on empirical 
outcome and the data presented. 
4.5 Instrumental Variables and Endogeneity 
Another possible issue for the baseline model is endogenous variables. As seen in the 
theory section, there is a good case for the selected variables affecting long-term interest 
rates. However, there is also reason to believe higher interest rates by themselves can 
lead to problems to service debts, this due to higher market risk-premium that lead to 
higher price on debt. This possible issue with reverse causality will result in endogenous 
regressors and the error-term will be correlated with the explanatory variables, leading 
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to biased and inconsistent results15. In addition if the true process is dynamic, applying 
fixed effect estimation results in an overestimation of the true marginal effect.16 
 In order to tackle this potential problem with reverse causality, 
instrumental variables will be used to provide alternative estimates. Discussion 
regarding instruments in dynamic panels is discussed by Bond (2002); pointing out that 
one does not have to seek far for appropriate instruments. The endogeneity can be solved 
by using lagged explanatory variables as instruments. 17  Of course, an important 
restriction for a good instrument is that there are correlation between the explanatory 
variables and its respective instrument. In similar studies (Ardagna et al, 2007; Faini, 
2006) variables specified in the baseline model are suitable to be instrumented by their 
lagged values. 
 Our instrumental variables chosen will be lagged by one or two periods, 
depending if differenced or not. This is a limitation chosen to avoid the issue of excessive 
amount of instruments18. Consequently, in test runs including additional instruments in 
terms of third and fourth lagged value, the significance dropped for a majority of the 
variables. Also, other useful GMM techniques such as system GMM are problematic due 
to the relatively long time dimension, also being prone to excessive instruments. 
5 Results 
In this section, results are presented for both the short and long-term effects. First the 
long-term results will be presented followed by the short-term. First in Table 5.1, results 
from the Panel-DOLS regression are presented. For both specifications government debt 
is insignificant at all confidence levels. In contrast, short-term interest is significant at a 
1 percent level for both specifications and the results are similar in both estimates and 
standard-error.   
 
                                                 
15 See Verbeek (2012: 146-147) 
16 First, considering our dependent variable follows a dynamic model: yit=βxit' +γyi,t-1+αi+uit , it is 
clear that the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the individual-specific effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. 
Secondly, if a first difference estimator is used, yi,t-1 will be correlated with ui,t-1 (Verbeek, 2012: 
396-397) 
17 Assuming a basic model: yit=βx'it+vit, where x'it contains a vector of explanatory variables. If 
suspected that x'it is correlated with vit which is the shock of the same period. Given x'it is treated 
as endogenous it follow the dependent variable symmetrically, thus making lagged values of x'it 
acceptable instruments (Bond, 2002). 
18 Too many instruments might lead to small sample bias or poor estimation of variance matrix 
(Verbeek, 2012: 403-404) 
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Table 5.1 Panel-DOLS 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables DOLS DOLS 
   
GDEBT 0.0231 0.0206 
 (0.0189) (0.0202) 
 
STI 0.479*** 0.482*** 
 (0.0928) (0.0991) 
   
   
Observations 693 649 
R-squared 0.078 0.140 
Note: Model (1) and (2) includes GDEBT and STI based on 
IPS unit root tests. Model (1) includes two lags and leads 
and Model (2) includes four lags and leads. Significance: 
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
Next are the short-term results. Once again, these are divided into the six following 
groups: (1) Show the full sample for the full time period (2) includes the GIIPS-countries 
for the full time period (3) includes the non-GIIPS countries for the whole period (4) 
includes the GIIPS restricted to the time period 2009-2015, (5) includes only the non-
GIIPS countries restricted to the time period 2009-2015 and lastly (6) all countries in the 
sample other restricted to the time period 2009-2015. 
 In Table 5.2, the first variable GDEBT is weakly significant in a majority of 
the specifications and show a negative effect for all estimates. It is significant at a 5 
percent level for the non-GIIPS countries, for the whole sample and the GIIPS after 
2009. Next, GDEF is significant for all specifications except for the non GIIPS countries 
after 2009. The effect from GDEF is clearly higher for the GIIPS countries, spanning 
from 5.93 basis points effect on interest over the whole time period and 17.6 basis points 
after 2009. This compared to 1.83 basis point effect for rest of the EMU during the whole 
period. Further, looking at the interactive variable, INT, it has similar significance as 
GDEF.  The effects for the GIIPS countries are 3.87 basis points for the whole period and 
19.4 basis points after 2009, which means the interactive term is higher than GDEF 
after the crisis. This can be compared to 2.85 basis points for rest of EMU and an 
insignificant result after the crisis. Results from the full specification indicate there are 
slightly smaller effects if the whole sample is included compared to only the GIIPS 
countries. However, there are clear differences between GIIPS and the rest of EMU. All 
the control variables behave as predicted in terms of signs and show mixed significance. 
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Table 5.2 Baseline Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
All GIIPS 
Non-
GIIPS GIIPS* 
Non-
GIIPS* All* 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
        ΔGDEBT -0.0949* -0.0990 -0.0708*** -0.116 -0.0731** -0.110* 
 
 
(0.0485) (0.0618) (0.0125) (0.0679) (0.0194) (0.0531) 
 GDEF 0.0485*** 0.0593*** 0.0183** 0.176*** 0.0515 0.157*** 
 
 
(0.00814) (0.00569) (0.00513) (0.0374) (0.0398) (0.0286) 
 INT 0.0347*** 0.0387** 0.0285* 0.194** 0.0666 0.170*** 
 
 
(0.00448) (0.00957) (0.0141) (0.0477) (0.0579) (0.0337) 
 ΔSTI 0.163** 0.151* 0.109*** 0.892* 0.0972 0.451** 
 
 
(0.0514) (0.0692) (0.0198) (0.338) (0.0995) (0.187) 
 GDPG -0.0653 -0.0894 0.000788 -0.0819 -0.0102 -0.0875 
 
 
(0.114) (0.172) (0.0148) (0.228) (0.0224) (0.179) 
 INF 0.0671** 0.0959** 0.00334 0.192** 0.0126 0.143** 
 
 
(0.0238) (0.0275) (0.0178) (0.0490) (0.0132) (0.0460) 
 CONSTANT -0.00135* -0.00241* -7.04e-05 -0.00153* -0.000523 -0.00193** 
 
 
(0.000687) (0.00108) (0.000405) (0.000563) (0.000336) (0.000701) 
 
        Observations 737 335 402 135 162 297 
 R-squared 0.120 0.132 0.163 0.259 0.121 0.219 
 Number of countries 11 5 6 5 6 11 
 Note: Regression (1)-(3) includes the full time period while (4)-(6) includes the time period 2009-2015. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Next in Table 5.3, two sets of exponential variables for government debt and fiscal deficit 
are added. First, looking at the baseline variables they provide similar estimates as the 
previous regression both in terms of significance and effects. Moreover, the exponential 
effects of debt are only significant for non-GIIPS countries. In contrast, both non-linear 
variables for deficit are significant looking at the whole sample and the GIIPS countries 
over the whole period. The significant effects from debt are negative and the significant 
results for deficit are positive. All exponential variables added change in terms of 
significance between specifications of the dummy, providing somewhat inconclusive 
results. Most notably is the non-significance after the crisis in the majority of 
specifications. 
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Table 5.3 Baseline Model and Exponential Effects 
 
 
 
All GIIPS 
Non-
GIIPS GIIPS* 
Non-
GIIPS* All* 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔGDEBT -0.0947* -0.0982 -0.0709*** -0.115 -0.0719** -0.109* 
 
(0.0494) (0.0641) (0.0128) (0.0688) (0.0196) (0.0539) 
GDEF 0.0301** 0.0306 0.00549 0.150 0.0652** 0.130*** 
 
(0.0114) (0.0152) (0.0104) (0.0983) (0.0223) (0.0410) 
INT 0.0554*** 0.0601** -0.00949 0.196*** 0.0399 0.172*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0183) (0.0373) (0.0422) (0.0615) (0.0323) 
ΔSTI 0.146** 0.133 0.112*** 0.863* 0.0998 0.430** 
 
(0.0646) (0.0859) (0.0182) (0.338) (0.0987) (0.184) 
GDPG -0.0723 -0.105 -0.000452 -0.0911 -0.0136 -0.0937 
 
(0.112) (0.171) (0.0147) (0.246) (0.0234) (0.180) 
INF 0.0649** 0.0911* 5.19e-05 0.193** 0.00174 0.142** 
 
(0.0262) (0.0336) (0.0183) (0.0643) (0.0132) (0.0522) 
GDEBT2 -0.000126 0.00155 -0.00268** -0.00107 -0.00236 -0.000111 
 
(0.00210) (0.00400) (0.000555) (0.00364) (0.00125) (0.00153) 
GDEF2 0.149*** 0.197* -0.219 0.0966 -0.359 0.0912 
 
(0.0203) (0.0733) (0.139) (0.244) (0.347) (0.0843) 
GDEBT*2 0.000821 0.000957 -0.00393 -0.000694 -0.00606** -0.00142 
 
(0.00235) (0.00360) (0.00215) (0.00644) (0.00220) (0.00334) 
GDEF*2 0.153*** 0.172*** -0.112 0.0874 -0.326 0.0935 
 
(0.0315) (0.0239) (0.150) (0.254) (0.289) (0.0843) 
CONSTANT -0.00119* -0.00181 0.000224 -0.000693 0.000372 -0.00120 
 
(0.000584) (0.00108) (0.000388) (0.00273) (0.000482) (0.00113) 
       Observations 737 335 402 135 162 297 
R-squared 0.128 0.139 0.165 0.260 0.128 0.220 
Number of countries 11 5 6 5 6 11 
Note: The non-starred exponentials are the squared value of debt and deficits. The corresponding 
starred values are subtracted by the sample median value for each sample before squared. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.1 Robustness Testing 
The short-term results provided in the preceding section are all estimated with the fixed-
effects OLS estimator. In order to provide robustness to estimates, reinforcing 
regressions has been done in order to test for both autocorrelation and possible 
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endogeneity. Only the 2SLS estimation will be presented in this section, while the FGLS 
and lagged explanatory variable inference can be found in the Appendix.  
 First, looking at Table 5.4 Wooldridge’s test for autocorrelation within 
panels is shown and results indicate there are autocorrelation between the dependent 
and explanatory variables. However, since Wooldridge’s test cannot be performed for 
differenced variables and the first-difference stationary variables has been estimated in 
by their first difference, there are reason to believe this might have corrected partially 
for this autocorrelation. To examine this further, in Table 5.5 results from FGLS 
estimation can be seen. Comparing these with the baseline model shows there are small 
differences between the two coming to GDEBT. Looking at GDEF and INT, their 
estimates are somewhat lower and the same for the overall significance. As both the 
fixed effect model and GLS account for heteroscedasticity, the first through robust 
standard errors and the other through chosen weights, the gain to be found are through 
lower variance and loss of autocorrelation (Verbeek, 2012)19. However, estimates deviate 
within the range of the baseline model, proposing the problem of autocorrelation to not 
be severe in the sense of estimates. 
 Furthermore, the intuitively opposite sign of government debt raise 
warning signs regarding misspecification. However, in Table 5.5 casual inference is 
presented by adding lagged values to government debt and testing the possibility of a 
delayed effect. Results indicate that both the first and second lag is insignificant whilst 
the fourth lag is significant and also alters to a positive effect. This is an intuitive one 
year lagged effect. Hence, the lagged value of government debt might be a better value 
for further studies or including a proxy to the lagged debt. However, including lagged 
explanatory variables in the baseline model can provide additional bias or endogeneity 
issues (Bellemare, 2015) and are thus left out.  
 Additionally, there might be endogeneity which makes the baseline bias and 
inconsistent. In the regression estimated in previous section, the most apparent would 
be reverse causality between LTI and GDEBT. In Table 5.6 results from 2SLS 
estimation are presented. In accord, with reverse causality, the baseline model seems to 
overestimate the true effect (Verbeek, 2012)20. However, the 2SLS has similar issue as 
the GLS estimation, providing scattered results in terms of significance. In addition, 
both INT and GDEF lose significance and the interactive variable change sign. As it is 
hard to provide good instruments, these estimates provide a critical view on the earlier 
                                                 
19 See Verbeek (2012: 101-102) 
20 See Verbeek (2012: 147) 
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estimates. The choice of using lagged explanatory variables as instruments and a slight 
loss in significance follows similar studies (Faini, 2006; Ardagna et al, 2007). 
 In conclusion, the robustness check provides a critical view to the estimates 
presented by the fixed effects model. However, in the original model both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are accounted for to some degree. The most 
significant change between estimation methods is the loss of significance using 
instruments. Also, the inference regarding lagged values of government debt brings 
critique to the specification of current debt and proposes prudence regarding 
interpretations. Nonetheless, the estimates by earlier research and the FGLS estimates 
are within similar magnitude as the baseline model, thus providing some robustness to 
the initial results.  
 
Table 5.7 Instrumental variables 2SLS 
 
 
All GIIPS 
Non-
GIIPS GIIPS* 
Non-
GIIPS* All* 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
  
      ΔGDEBT -0.0307*** -0.0451*** -0.0146 -0.0506** -0.155* -0.0427*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0152) (0.0225) (0.0249) (0.0882) (0.0162) 
GDEF 0.0314* 0.0330 0.00372 0.0638 0.154 0.0713 
 
(0.0181) (0.0299) (0.0356) (0.0806) (0.153) (0.0463) 
INT -0.0654*** -0.107*** 0.0488 -0.0415 0.644 -0.0341 
 
(0.0251) (0.0366) (0.0672) (0.0900) (0.399) (0.0552) 
INF 0.0822*** 0.0949*** 0.0142 0.201*** 0.286** 0.180*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0228) (0.0255) (0.0736) (0.129) (0.0395) 
ΔSTI 0.0171 -0.0539 0.399*** -0.177 0.948* -0.0561 
 
(0.0557) (0.0955) (0.142) (0.558) (0.574) (0.254) 
GDPG -0.0855*** -0.115*** -0.0145 -0.199* 0.170 -0.134** 
 
(0.0224) (0.0350) (0.0376) (0.111) (0.126) (0.0602) 
CONSTANT 0.00159*** 0.00276** 0.000814 0.00653*** 0.00601 0.00285*** 
 
(0.000611) (0.00114) (0.000961) (0.00238) (0.00368) (0.00109) 
       Observations 715 325 390 125 150 275 
Number of countries 11 5 6 5 6 11 
Note: All explanatory variables are instrumented with their first or second lag depending if 
differenced or not. If differenced, the second lagged is used. Standard errors in parentheses, 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2 Discussion 
In contrast to conventional theory, a negative relation between long rates and 
government debt were found for most specifications. A positive effect was found for both 
fiscal deficits and the interaction in-between deficits and debts.  In addition, no long-
term effects were found from government debt within the EMU. Results also indicate 
that the countries within GIIPS were influenced by their fiscal liabilities to a larger 
degree than the rest of EMU. Also, the interactive term enhances the effect after the 
crisis for both the GIIPS countries and the full sample estimation. Notable are the non-
significant effect for Non-GIIPS countries during the crisis. These findings and the brief 
data display suggests there are arbitrary discrepancies between countries in terms of 
long rates response to fiscal difficulties. 
 Furthermore, effects are in accord to previous studies in terms of magnitude 
for fiscal deficits while the results for government debt are not alike (Faini, 2006; 
Ardagna et al, 2007; Laubach, 2009). But, studies in the review include samples before 
the sovereign debt crisis of 2009 and most of them for a different set of countries. As 
examined within the data section, the debt issued by governments is quite homogenous 
all over the sample, above 60 percent levels for the majority of countries. No particular 
differences are found between France and Belgium compared to Greece and Portugal. 
This would indicate, as do the regression results, that government debt alone might be 
redundant in terms of affecting interest rates. The negative effect of debt may be an 
effect of the ECB’s efforts of holding interest rates down through open market 
operations, providing an overall negative effect as a consequence of increased demand in 
government bonds issued by EMU countries (De Grauwe, 2013). Furthermore, one of the 
disparities between the GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries is the effect of fiscal deficits. 
After the 2009, GIIPS had a 17.6 basis point effect compared to the insignificant 
counterpart for rest of EMU. This result indicate that the importance of fiscal deficits for 
this given time period. In addition, the results presented from the interactive variable 
propose that it is the combined sustainability of debt and deficit that matters, thus 
assign government debt shared significance. More precise, for the GIIPS countries, in 
particular after 2009 the effect from said interaction is 19.4 basis points, in contrast to 
the no significance for non-GIIPS countries.  
 Previous section suggests a difference in terms of how fiscal liabilities affect 
long rates within EMU. Interestingly, the effects seem to be somewhat arbitrary 
considering the data, especially for the countries France and Belgium with similar debt 
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and deficits as those affected the most after 2009. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the 
GIIPS are distinctively different in three ways: First, both Spain and Ireland were 
affected by a liquidity crisis in their respective bank sectors, which is not included for in 
the model (Lane, 2009). Second, both Greece and Portugal are exceptions in terms of 
consistent fiscal deficits, which also are indicated by the results to have a large positive 
effect on interests. Last, Italy had the largest debt when crisis hit and had consistently 
running 3 percent or slightly above deficits. A realistic assumption due to the situation 
especially in Greece but also in Ireland and Spain where unknown facts came up to 
surface, Italy’s fiscal standings might provoke a similar anticipation regarding their 
ability to service debt. The last sentence has been a common explanation to why the 
effects might have been absent for Belgium and France, namely a disparity in 
anticipated national ability to service debts (Kopf, 2010). Unfortunately, variables 
including expectations are not taken into consideration in the models used in this paper 
and are thus proposed for further studies. 
 The disparity in long rates and the consequences it brings has opened up for 
a discussion, asking if there has been an ambiguous penalty assigned to the GIIPS 
countries. Looking back at theory, the structure within the EMU might be untenable and 
countries with certain characteristics less prone to provide responsibility, possessing 
unfavourable historical factors, representing a smaller economy or other country specific 
factors, might be exposed to interest rates hikes than others. In addition, ECB’s open 
market operations have favoured countries with “good” debt, another factor which 
indirect penalize countries holding “bad” debt (Lane, 2009). Of course, the opposing view 
involves problems with moral-hazard and that the market learns by example. 
Nonetheless, if such a self-regulating mechanism do not work equally for all participants 
within the system, criticism towards such a mechanism is fair.  
In conclusion, if EMU were constructed with the partial goal of financial 
stability, this paper suggests fiscal liabilities have asymmetric effects on interest rates 
within EMU and over time. After 2009, the GIIPS countries were particularly affected by 
high interest, which can be interpreted as a market penalty. In addition, if the penalties 
for fiscal carelessness are to be equal, long-term interest rates suggest otherwise, 
favouring countries such as Belgium and France over Greece and Portugal. 
Consequently nations afflicted the most by high interests has fewer options to recover 
due to the common monetary policy. Lastly, answering the purpose of the paper, that our 
results indicate a disparity between countries within the EMU and propose a 
restructuring of fiscal policy matters within the union. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper has evaluated short and long-run effects between long-term interest rates 
and fiscal liabilities within EMU. Attention to which channels that impact long rates are 
presented and the method applies fixed effect models and cointegration technique’s to 
test determinants. Particular specifications are made to capture the disparities in the 
aftermath of EU’s sovereign debt crisis and between countries.  
 Next, the data is examined through a graphical display; pointing out both 
similarities and discrepancies between the GIIPS countries and the rest of EMU. 
Furthermore, results from the baseline model point towards the importance of fiscal 
deficit as well as the interaction between debt and deficit in order to find the effect on 
long rates. Additionally, the partial effect of government debt is significantly negative, 
going against conventional theory. Cointegration for government debt is found within 
the whole panel but was insignificant in the Panel-DOLS, thus no long-term effects of 
debt upon interest rates were found. This is in accordance to the Ricardian view, 
however, a result to be taken with caution due to the need for a more comprehensive 
model. Results also indicate an overall higher effect from fiscal liabilities for the GIIPS 
countries than the rest of EMU. 
 The asymmetric effects within the EMU, although similar fiscal standings, 
suggests there are intangible factors that affect interests rates. In addition, the response 
from ECB by acting as lender of last resort seemed to affect countries in regard to the 
presumed fiscal sustainability. The negative effect found from government debt is 
interpreted alongside the interactive term; the former indicates debt can have a zero 
effect and the latter points towards that sufficiently high debt alongside deficit reinforces 
an increasing effect for long rates.  
 To sum up, results provide both intuitive and conflicting answers. 
Discussion of the results is based on theoretical considerations and events before and 
after the crisis. Results are built on the fiscal standings within the country, however, 
missing certain aspects such as expectations and other macroeconomic factors – thus 
results are to be interpreted with prudence.  
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Appendix 
Tables and figures are listed in order of appearance in the paper. They are numbered by chapter 
of appearance and order of appearance. First table is a variables description 
 
 
Table 1 Description: Variables and Sources 
 
 
Variable Explanation Expected 
outcome 
Source 
Dependent 
variable 
  DataStream 
Long-term interest 
rates (LTI) 
10 year interest 
rates (quarterly) 
 Oxford Economics 
Explanatory 
variables 
   
Government Debt-to-
GDP ratio (GDEBT) 
Nominal debt 
divided by 
nominal GDP 
(quarterly) 
 
Positive (+) Oxford Economics 
 
Fiscal Deficit-to-GDP 
ratio (GDEF) 
Nominal deficits 
divided by 
nominal GDP 
(quarterly) 
Positive (+) Oxford Economics 
Inflation (INF) Nominal inflation 
(quarterly) 
Positive (+) Oxford Economics 
Short-term interest 
rate (STI) 
3 month interest 
rates (quarterly) 
Positive (+) Oxford Economics 
GDP growth (GDPG) Yearly change in 
Gross domestic 
product 
(quarterly) 
Negative (-) 
 
 
Oxford Economics 
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Table 4.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Variables Test: 
LLC 
Unadj. 
t-value 
Adj. t-
value 
AIC lag 
average 
p-value 
LTI  -2.575 2.593 2.18 0.995 
GDEBT  0.990 4.132 2.09 1.0000 
GDEF  -6.398 -2.248 3.18 0.012** 
IVAR  -5.699 -2.059 3.00 0.020** 
INF  -6.727 -0.142 3.73 0.444 
STI  -6.354 -2.555 1.18 0.005*** 
GDPG  -11.707 -7.868 1.45 0.000*** 
Variables Test: 
IPS 
 W-t-bar AIC lag 
average 
p-value 
LTI   2.080 2.18 0.981 
GDEBT   6.916 2.09 1.000 
GDEF   -3.433 3.18 0.000*** 
IVAR   -1.861 3.00 0.031** 
INF   -2.001 3.73 0.022** 
STI   -1.151 1.18 0.125 
GDPG   -9.577 1.45 0.000*** 
Note: First, the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) test applied testing for the H0 : 
Panels contain unit roots and the alternative Ha: Panels are stationary. 
Second, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests the H0: All panels contain unit 
roots with alternative Ha: Some panels are stationary. For both the LLC and 
IPS test the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is selected in order to 
determine lag length within the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) equations. 
As in earlier studies, the hypothesis is tested at a 95% confidence level. 
Significance: ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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Table 4.2 Cointegration Tests 
 
 
Cointegration 
(LTI and) 
Gt Ga Pt Pa 
GDEBT -0.364 -1.266 -4.624*** -3.937*** 
STI -2.311*** -4.043 -3.772** -2.244* 
ALL -1.928** -5.360 -7.729*** -9.176*** 
Note: Westerlund’s panel cointegration test is applied. 
Cointegration is checked for government debt, short-term interest 
rates and both variables at the same time (ALL). It does test four 
different hypotheses, testing whether the error correction term is 
significant both at the whole panel and within the individual 
panels. Gt  and Ga  test for cointegration for at least one of the 
panels. If H0 is rejected at least of the panels are cointegrated. Pt 
and Pa  pools the information over cross-sectional units, thus a 
rejection of H0 should be taken as evidence of cointegration for the 
panel as a whole. Significance: ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Wooldridge’s Panel Autocorrelation Test 
 
Test Test 
Statistic 
F( 1,  10) 188.979 
Prob>F 0.00000 
  
Note: Null-hypothesis: no first 
order autocorrelation. This 
null is rejected at a one 
percent level. 
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Table 5.5 FGLS 
 
 
 
All GIIPS 
Non-
GIIPS GIIPS* 
Non-
GIIPS* All* 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS 
              
ΔGDEBT -0.0935*** -0.0972*** -0.0694*** -0.124*** -0.0730*** -0.116*** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0183) (0.0135) (0.0274) (0.0180) (0.0183) 
GDEF 0.0413*** 0.0540*** 0.0121 0.113*** 0.0159 0.0975*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0185) (0.0120) (0.0347) (0.0257) (0.0232) 
INT 0.0294* 0.0358 0.0142 0.102** 0.00185 0.0796*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0249) (0.0190) (0.0438) (0.0297) (0.0288) 
ΔSTI 0.158*** 0.146 0.112** 0.863* 0.101 0.439* 
 
(0.0601) (0.115) (0.0437) (0.493) (0.110) (0.236) 
GDPG -0.0643*** -0.0836** 0.00316 -0.151 -0.00913 -0.127** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0396) (0.0227) (0.0984) (0.0404) (0.0593) 
INF 0.0619*** 0.0920*** 0.00496 0.167*** 0.0115 0.126*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0265) (0.0141) (0.0588) (0.0210) (0.0341) 
CONSTANT -0.00118** -0.00223** -0.000200 -0.00208 -0.00101* -0.00229** 
 
(0.000468) (0.00101) (0.000345) (0.00191) (0.000551) (0.000965) 
       Observations 737 335 402 135 162 297 
Number of countries 11 5 6 5 6 11 
Note: In this table, FGLS estimation is performed of the baseline model. Regression (1)-(3) includes 
the full time period while (4)-(6) includes the time period 2009-2015 Standard errors in 
parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.6 Fixed effects, Lagged Debt 
 
 
  All GIIPS 
Non-
GIIPS GIIPS* 
Non-
GIIPS* All* 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       ΔGDEBT -0.113** -0.131** -0.0626*** -0.222** -0.101*** -0.187*** 
 
(0.0374) (0.0425) (0.00993) (0.0489) (0.0135) (0.0379) 
ΔGDEBT(-4) 0.0867*** 0.104** 0.0181* 0.0940*** 0.0102 0.0824*** 
 
(0.0250) (0.0230) (0.00878) (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0153) 
ΔGDEBT(-2) -0.0177 -0.0310 0.0108 -0.0634 -0.0202** -0.0411 
 
(0.0272) (0.0311) (0.00885) (0.0307) (0.00518) (0.0293) 
ΔGDEBT(-1) -0.0207 -0.0275 -0.0193 -0.0662 -0.0946*** -0.0501** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0356) (0.0152) (0.0213) 
GDEF 0.0426*** 0.0575*** -0.0190 0.0562 -0.0541 0.118** 
 
(0.00928) (0.0125) (0.0101) (0.0729) (0.0547) (0.0477) 
INT 0.0683*** 0.0969** -0.0545* 0.188** -0.133 0.186*** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0277) (0.0249) (0.0644) (0.0785) (0.0446) 
ΔSTI 0.138 0.114 0.138** 1.682 0.0765 0.769 
 
(0.102) (0.114) (0.0393) (1.319) (0.127) (0.580) 
GDPG -0.112 -0.149 -0.0306** -0.220 0.0433* -0.159 
 
(0.114) (0.163) (0.00948) (0.379) (0.0203) (0.216) 
INF 0.0883** 0.126* 0.0165 0.428** 0.0593 0.279** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0513) (0.0134) (0.109) (0.0330) (0.0968) 
Constant -0.00186** -0.00339* 0.000161 -0.0122* -0.00258* -0.00895* 
 
(0.000728) (0.00136) (0.000361) (0.00447) (0.00114) (0.00419) 
       Observations 693 315 378 115 138 253 
R-squared 0.206 0.246 0.161 0.434 0.307 0.357 
Number of countries 11 5 6 5 6 11 
Note: The purpose in this estimation is to provide inference to the sign of GDEBT. Regression (1)-(3) 
includes the full time period while (4)-(6) includes the time period 2009-2015. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
       
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
